

our utmost Might, at the Hazard of our Lives and Fortunes, all open Attempts that at any Time may be made, or pretended to be made against the Peace of His most gracious Majesty; and by our steady Concurrence on all such Occasions, convince the whole Christian World, that *GEORGE* the Second, by the Grace of God King of *Great-Britain*, reigns more absolutely in the Hearts of his Subjects, than any *French* or Popish Tyrant can do over the Purfes of his Slaves. AMEN.

*here is no mention of ships
being sent to lower a material
point*

F I N I S.



THE
OPERATIONS
OF THE
WAR
FOR THE
FIRST TWELVE MONTHS,

Examin'd and Accounted for:

From a Late MINISTERIAL PIECE, Called,

THE
GRAND QUESTION,

Whether WAR or no WAR with

SPAIN, &c.

— — *Celebrare Domestica Facta.*



L O N D O N:

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THE

OPERATIONS

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MAY, 28, 1913

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ENGLISH HISTORICAL TRACTS

FIRST TWELVE MONTHS

Examined and Accounted for

From a Land-Minister's Paper

THE

GRAND QUESTION

Whether War is to be

1891-1892

THE
OPERATIONS
 OF THE
WAR with SPAIN

EXAMINED and ACCOUNTED for, &c.

WE may now, literally speaking, be said to have been in a State of War one entire Year, and with a Power that has sufficiently exposed its own Weakness, and Inability to resist us, by not daring, during that whole Term, to effect any thing against us, either in *Europe* or *America*: Altho' our Enemy's Fleets have had much better Opportunities, than, I hope, our M——ry will ever let them have again. In what Pain were we some Months ago, when we received Advice of the first sailing of the *Ferrol* Squadron, it being at that time the general Opinion, that their Expedition was intended against our *Leeward* Islands; nor could any honest *Briton* rest satisfied, till he was informed of that Fleet's Arrival at *Cadiz*. What increased our Concern was, that the united

B

Squadrons

Squadrons under the Admirals *H———* and *O——e*, which were cruising betwixt *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, were more than sufficient to annihilate them. But in order to be as impartial as possible, let us take a short, but a methodical Review of our Conduct from the Commencement of the War to the end of *October*, 1740. that we may the better judge how consistent a Part our *M——ry* have acted, with the many Opportunities which have so surprizingly been offered to them, and which, I believe, few *M——ies* before this, were ever so lucky, in so short a time, to have in their Power.

I will allow, we began the War with some Disadvantage, it being declar'd at the beginning of the Winter, and at a Time, when we were destitute of a sufficient Number of Marines and Transports to enable us to open it with Success. But even those Deficiencies might have been, in a great measure, supplied, without exposing the Nation to any kind of Danger. We had then 18000 Land-Forces on foot, 4 or 5000 of which, might have been very well spared and dispatched after Mr. *V———n* in the Months of *October* and *November*, on board our Men of War, which (if not dissipated in a Storm) would have reach'd him time enough to have executed his Designs upon *Carthagena* and *Panama*. Whereby we might have possess'd ourselves, not only of
much

much Riches, but of a sure Bird-in-hand, which must have infallibly obliged the *Spaniard* to change his Note, and suppliantly sue for a Peace.

This was what People expected, before the ten Regiments arrived here from *Ireland*. But their Arrival seem'd to put it beyond all doubt, no one foreseeing that we stood in need of such an additional *Corps*, merely to defend this Kingdom. And those Regiments were thought the more unnecessary, because at the very time they were sent for, an Order was issued for the speedy raising of ten Thousand additional Land-Forces, to be incorporated with the present Regiments. But, alas! how soon were we deceived in our just Expectations? How soon did we find them intended, only to add to the Number of our inactive Standing-Army, which of course increased our Oppression? Yet have I never heard to this day, any plausible Reason assigned, why they were brought over hither, except the old stale Pretence, *viz.* to defend us against a foreign Invasion. But even this, could never be seriously insisted on, because those who advanced so glaring an Absurdity, well knew it was too bare-faced to go down, with any Man who had a tolerable Share of Common-Sense. For, did we fear an Invasion, *Ireland*, the very Place from whence they were drawn, lay more expos'd than *England* to such an

Attempt, and consequently stood most in need of their Presence. If we add to this, that his Majesty became, at that Juncture of Time, truly sensible of the Necessity for raising a Body of *Marines* to be employed against the Enemy, there must appear the less Occasion for *Irish* Assistance. Whereupon it became natural to suppose, that those Troops were intended to be employ'd in some Expedition against the Enemy, till the *Marines* could be raised, and well disciplin'd fit for Service. But Time (which never fails to bring all things to light) has shewn us the contrary, as well as what vast Advantages we have lost, by suffering Admiral *V—n* to sail without any Land-Forces, and by sending none after him for one whole Year; the first and most eligible Opportunity of reducing the Enemy being elapsed, as he was then the less able to resist any Force we could have sent against him.

The next Thing we were greatly wanting in, was a sufficient Number of Twenty-Gun Ships, which were to build on our Entrance into the War; and for want of which, an incredible Number of our Merchant-Men became a Prey to the *Sebastian* Privateers, Yet so lightly did we seem to esteem the Sufferings of our Merchants on that Score, by not sending two or three Forty-Gun Ships to cruize off the above-named Port, that till within these three or four Months, I never
heard

heard of any Ship or Ships being stationed thereabouts, notwithstanding our publick Prints were daily cramm'd with Accounts of the Seizures made, and carried into that insignificant Place. Insignificant I call it, because I have been informed from some of those unhappy Seamen, who have been confin'd there since the War, and had made a lucky Escape; that no longer ago than last June, the Fort of *St. Sebastian's* was in so weak a Condition, as not to be able to defend itself against three Ships of the Line, and two Fire-Ships, there being no more than 16 Cannon to defend the Place. If this Account be true, (which I never yet heard contradicted) what a Disgrace must it reflect upon *Britain*, which could then have spared thrice that Number of Ships from her own Coasts for such an Expedition, without hardly missing them? Why therefore those Privateers were suffer'd to reign for ten or twelve Months successively; and why after so long a Forbearance, a small Squadron of Men of War was not dispatch'd to destroy the Fortifications of that Place, especially after we had received Intelligence of its Condition from Persons on the Spot: I say, why these Things were suffer'd, wants still to be explained by the M—— or his Agents, for those out of P——r either cannot, or dare not unfold them.

I will allow indeed, that *St. Sebastians* for the first two or three Months, was a Place below our Notice. Because at the beginning of the War, the Enemy in that Port, could not muster up above four or five small Privateers. But we soon found to our Cost, that they were good Judges of Political Arithmetic, for every tolerable Merchant Ship or Sloop they took, which they saw fit for that Purpose, was immediately converted into a Privateer; and being mann'd, with a suitable Supply of Arms, Ammunition and Provisions, was station'd at a proper Distance to intercept our outward and homeward bound Ships. Thus they not only increased their Riches, but their Strength, in proportion to our Losses. Which made an Expedition to destroy that Place, if possible, more than necessary, by reason we must certainly have found a double, nay, a treble account in it. First, by taking and plundering that Town, the major Part of what we had lost by our former Supineness, would in all Probability have been recover'd, which must have amounted to a very considerable Sum. Secondly, we should then have had an Opportunity to have deprived them of their Naval Force in that Place, by carrying off those Ships and Sloops which would have been fit for our Purpose, either as Privateers or Transports, and by destroying those which were not. And thirdly,

thirdly, it would then have been in our Power to have released two or three Hundred of our Sailors, which might be shut up in Prison at that time, groaning under the severe Treatment they daily met with, from the Cruelty of the Enemy, in order to force them into the *Spanish* Service.

From these melancholly Considerations, a truly *British* Heart must be convinced, that how much below our Notice soever, that Place appear'd to us, at the beginning of the War; yet within the space of half a Year, its Strength and Riches became so wonderfully increased by the Captures made, that, far from being a Disgrace, it must have reflected Honour upon any one of our Admirals who had undertaken and completed the Conquest of it.

Another Point which wants clearing up, is, why long and ruinous Embargoes were laid upon our Merchant Ships in order to gut them of their Seamen, and man the Royal Navy, for no other Purpose, as it afterwards appear'd, than to guard our home Coasts, or at most to be ready for an Expedition, which, if intended at all, was not to be undertaken till several Months afterwards. We seem'd by taking such a Step, to be very lavish of our Mariners; since those who had the Direction of Naval Affairs, could not be ignorant of the Losses and Inconveniencies which our Merchants must

must sustain by such Embargoes: Besides the Distempers our Sailors are more or less subject to, while kept in an inactive State, which to them, is almost as bad as a State of Insensibility. Since the War, we have had a fresh, but fatal Experience of such Catastrophes; great Numbers of Sailors falling sick for want of the usual Exercise on board, which Sickness prov'd fatal to some Fifties of them, insomuch that the Admiralty thought proper to provide an Hospital-Ship for the Reception of the Sick, to prevent the Contagion from affecting the whole Crews. It has been computed, that we have lost (in the last eight or nine Months) more Seamen by Sickness, than we possibly could have done, had a Squadron been employ'd in storming and plundering *St. Sebastians*. Another Thing that has created the Admiration of most Men, was the sending of Admiral *B—ch—n* with six Men of War, to *Reconnoitre* the Enemy's two Squadrons in the Harbour of *Ferrol*, which consisted of twenty-four Sail, but in a wretched Condition, wanting many Necessaries, and not reinforcing him with such an additional Supply, as might have enabled him to have destroy'd the Enemy's Fleet in that Harbour. This might have been render'd practicable by putting a Number of Land-Forces on board our Men of War, and landing them at some little Distance from the Harbour,

bour, and so contrived, as to attack the Enemy at once by Sea and Land. But instead of doing that, it was thought expedient to recall Sir *Ch—r O—e* with nine Sail from the *Mediterranean*. Which Squadron alone, would have been sufficient to have block'd up the Enemy in *Ferrol*; till Mr. *B—ch—n* had return'd with a fresh Supply. By missing that Opportunity of destroying the then whole Naval Force of *Spain*, we are likely to suffer sufficiently in *America*; which may make us look back to Time past with aching Hearts.

The Enemy's Fleets have since stolen away to the *West Indies*; and by this time, in all likelihood, the *French* Squadrons have joined them, which, no doubt, will be at hand to assist them, on every Emergency. We have little reason to imagine, that the Enemy will shew so much Complaisance to our Colonies, as to content himself with a bare View of them. On the contrary, we have much to fear for those valuable Settlements. Our Sugar Colonies may be plunder'd and destroyed, and much more damage done in divers Places, before Admiral *Ogle's* Squadron, with the Transports, can possibly arrive thither to prevent them. Our Gallant Admiral, who has fortified himself in *P—t-R—l* Harbour, with about eight Men of War, may be defeated, his Ships sunk, and *J—ca* sack'd. Should

this be the Case ; which Heaven avert ! What would all the Pretences in the World then avail us ? Would laying blame on the Winds alleviate our Losses, or administer the least Comfort to us ? On the contrary, the many Opportunities which Providence has favoured us with, had a right Use been made of them, would only serve to heighten those Misfortunes.

In what a Light do we appear in the Eye of the World, when by a List of our Men of War published in *December 1739*. It then appear'd, that there were 96 Line of Battle Ships in Commission, besides Store-Ships, Fire-Ships, Sloops, &c. to the amount of 33 more, which in all contain'd 34562 Seamen. Yet notwithstanding we had so fine a Fleet ; we suffer'd the Enemy, whose whole Naval Force, consisted of but a fourth part of ours in Number, in a manner, to reign Masters of the Sea, by permitting them to pass and repass from *Cadiz* to *Ferrol*, from *Ferrol* to *Cadiz*, and from *Cadiz* to *Ferrol* again, without any interruption by the Way ; long before they were prepared for an *American Voyage*.

When they thus danced about in this manner, could any Man reasonably imagine otherwise, than that the Force of *Spain* was superiour to that of *Great-Britain*. And thereupon the Weakness of the latter, compell'd

pell'd them to be idle Spectators of whatever Trips the former took.

But perhaps some of the ingenious Authors of the *Gazetteer*, may object and say, that in Appearance the above List might be right; but in fact, it might be wrong. And in order to support the oddity of their Argument, may produce us a few recent Instances, to shew how necessary it is, in Time of War especially, to put Ships in Commission, six Months before they can be got ready for any Service. Those Gentlemen may alledge in Vindication of such Conduct, (as they have heretofore done) That an ill-tim'd Frugality, may be attended with very fatal and mischievous Consequences. And at the same time may set forth the vast Advantages which this Nation must reap, by having young Gentlemen, the Sons of Noblemen, and other Persons of Distinction, nominated for the Command of our Men of War, before they are well off the Stocks. They then have time enough on their Hands, not only to raise a sufficient Number of good and able Sailors to mann their Ships, but also to take their Leaves of all that's dear to them on this side the Water, before they plough the unruly Ocean. And consequently there will be no occasion for hurrying them away, before their Affairs are half settled, as was the Case of Mr. *V——n*. One thing

I had almost forgot to mention, which those Authors may expatiate upon ; and that is the Advantages which must necessarily accrue to the Nation, by employing young Off—rs, just come of Age, on board the Fl—t. Which undoubtedly must be far greater, than if those Com——ns were given to Men of riper Years. 'Tis true, the latter may have most Experience, and probably have undergone many Hardships at Sea, which the former may be entire Strangers to.

But as to Experience, a very little of that, will serve against an impotent Enemy : and for Hardships and Dangers, which are frequent in that Element, none can be so proper to face such, as those who are totally ignorant of them. We have had some Experience of this, in a late Accident at S—t—h—d. On the other hand, *A burnt Child dreads the Fire* ; they who have surmounted many Difficulties, may be too apt to fear those which are to come. Besides, Nature will have its course ; their Intellects may be much impair'd, which can't be said of young Men who have known no other trouble, who have undergone no other Fatigue, since they came from School ; besides a few Voyages to St. H—ns, or perhaps to T—t—y, and back again.

I hope to be forgiven for this long Digression, which nothing should have draw
me

me into, but a desire of given the M——l Hirelings all the play possible, to vindicate the extraordinary Measures of their Patron.

I shall now proceed to take a little Notice of Admiral H——k's Position in the M——n. That Commander, during the last hard Winter, continued with part of his Fleet off the Bay of *Cadiz*, as suppos'd to prevent the *Spanish* Squadron from sailing on their intended Expedition. But as soon as the Weather grew milder, and the Spring appear'd, Mr. H——k was order'd to *Port-Mahon*, and Sir C——r O——le to remain at *Gibraltar*. Then it was, that the Enemy took the first advantage of sailing to *Ferrol*. I know it was said at that time, that *Port-Mahon* and *Minorca*, were both in danger ; but this afterwards appear'd nothing else than a Feint of the Enemy, in order thereby to gain an opportunity of sending out his Fleet. But why could not a *British* Fleet have been appointed to intercept them, by the Information of a Vessel or two, station'd off *Cadiz* for that purpose ? Such-like Schemes have been laid in former Wars, and executed with success. H——k and O——e at that time had 28 or 30 Men of War there, part of which might have been station'd in such a Latitude, as to have attack'd the Enemy's Fleet Front and Rear, and I may say, with a good probability of success, if we consider the inferior

inferior Force of the Enemy's Squadron, which then consisted of no more than eight Men of War and four Frigates.

But, upon Recollection, this Oversight, or Slip, or call it what you will, has been amply explain'd by a Tool of the M—ry, who seems candidly to acknowledge, that a Defensive War, was all his chief P—n aimed at. 'Tis true indeed, says he, * (*speaking of the Spithead Expeditions*) we have not subdued Kingdoms and Nations with our Armies, we have neither burnt Cities nor laid waste the Territories of our Neighbours! But what is most certainly of infinite more Consequence to us, we have by them preserved Peace and Prosperity through all our wide-extended Dominions, we have maintained our *Honour* and *Reputation* abroad, and made it further manifest in the Sight of all *Europe*, that if we have chosen the Ways of Peace, 'tis not because we were afraid of our Enemies, but because it was judged more agreeable to the true Interest of the Kingdom so to do. If our very Preparations for War have put an effectual Stop to the pernicious Designs of our Enemies against us, have we not more Reason to rejoice at it, than to murmur and complain? *If our Fleet riding in our Channel* (*This seems to allude to the laying aside Admiral N—s's Expedition*) has had the same

* *Daily Gazetteer*, Octob. 6. 1740.

“ same Effect, as it would in all probability
 “ have had, *had it engaged and beaten the*
 “ *Enemy*, what could we reasonably desire
 “ more of it, what more could we have
 “ gotten by the most bloody War, but a
 “ Stagnation of Trade, and a far greater
 “ Expence both of Men and Money ?”

The same Author, further says, † “ That
 “ with *Spain* our very Victories can be of
 “ no real Benefit and Advantage to us.
 “ (*Why then do we ever go to War with that*
 “ *Nation?*) For by engaging and humbling
 “ that Power, we in reality should fight the
 “ Battles of *France*, and contribute more
 “ to the aggrandizing that Monarchy, than
 “ all old *Louis's* Courage and Wisdom were
 “ able to effectuate.”

Many other Instances could I give, in De-
 fence of the present Measures, were not these
 sufficient. But I hope, no one who rightly con-
 siders the above Quotations, will be at a loss
 to account for what is past, or indeed for what
 may be to come. We from thence may learn,
 that our Intent in fitting out mighty Squa-
 drons, was not to burn Cities or Nations,
 but to maintain our Honour and Reputation
 abroad, by preserving Peace and Prosperity
 at home. That our Fleet riding in our
 Channel, has prevented the Enemy from in-
 vading us. Which seasonable Service has
 sufficiently answer'd it's extraordinary Ex-
 pence. That a defensive State is far prefer-
 able

† *Daily Gazetteer*, Octob. 10. 1740.

able to an offensive one. Because the first, may be maintained at a little Charge, whereas the latter will cost you both Blood and Treasure. That by destroying the *Spanish* Fleets, and humbling King *Philip*, we should only fight the Battles of *France*, and contribute towards aggrandizing that Power, for which Reason (although in a State of War) we ought never to snatch any Victory of Consequence from the *Spanish* Monarchy. Most excellent Doctrine truly! But as such-like reasoning is above my Comprehension, I shall leave it to those able Heads that negotiated the late fam'd Convention, without making any further Animadversions upon it.

The late Secret Expedition, which was to have been undertaken by Sir *J—N—s*, made as great a Noise for several Months, as if it had been intended to storm *Cadiz*; and the least we were to expect, was the Destruction of the *Spanish* Squadrons at *Ferrol*. But the contrary Winds disappointing that Admiral's sailing for several Weeks, and the Enemy not having the Complaisance to wait at *Ferrol*, till Sir *J—n*'s Arrival, that Expedition vanished without *Fire* or *Smoke*. It was thereupon thought adviseable to hasten the Preparations for Lord *C-----t*'s Expedition, and to dispatch Part of Sir *J---n*'s Squadron under Command of Sir *C—r O—e*, who with General *C-----t*'s Transports of Marines was to join Admiral *V---n* at

at *Jamaica*, and give the Enemy an effectual Blow in those Parts. But still new Delays appear'd, the Fleet must have an additional Supply of Stores, Ammunition and Provisions suitable to so long a Voyage. Whereupon no less than two Months Provisions were thought necessary to be added for that Purpose. This was resolved upon about the Middle of *September*, and it was said, three Weeks must be allowed, to ship those Necessaries on board. About this time also, the Money granted for Subsistence of the Marines was expended, and more solicited for here. Whereupon (if I'm rightly informed) their G-----l was advised to go upon Cr-----t : But he wisely refusing so to do, a Supply was sent him. And after having made many Attempts to get out of the Channel, they at length got a Wind for their Purpose; and set sail on the 26th of *October*, with 25 Men of War, 6 Fireships and two Hospital Ships, besides a great Number of Transports : Which Squadron carried about 2000 Guns, 14000 Seamen, and 6000 Marines. And having got clear of the *Land's-End*, pursued their Voyage to *America*; three Months after the Departure of the *Spanish* Squadrons from *Ferrol*. 'Tis generally thought, that his Majesty's Arrival from *Hanover*, hastened the sailing of this Fleet.

But how they will fare, with the superior

D

Force

Force of *France* and *Spain*, now in the *West Indies*, is not my Business at present to enquire.

I come now to touch upon a M——l Pamphlet, published near two Years ago, called, *The Grand Question whether War or no War with SPAIN impartially considered, in Defence of the present Measures, against those that delight in War*. This being the M——rs favourite Piece, accompanied the *Daily Gazetteers*, all over the three Kingdoms. By the latter Part of the Title, as well as by the many Passages contain'd therein, a Foreigner, who might be ignorant of the many Provocations and repeated Insults, we from time to time had received from the Hands of the *Spaniards*, would be apt to imagine, that the *Vox Populi* for a War, originally proceeded from the unjust Clamours of a restless Faction, who had set them upon it, purely with a View to distress the Administration, without the least Shadow of a Pretence, to support them in so extravagant a Measure. And that thereupon the M——ry found themselves obliged to expose the Weakness of the Nation, to enlarge upon the Strength of the *Spaniards*, and to illustrate the Impossibility of our ever gaining any considerable Advantages in a War with that Power, which could indemnify our Expences in the Prosecution of it, or procure us better Treatment for the time to come. In order to terrify the People from
so

so bloody a Resolution, and thereby draw them into an approbation of more gentle Methods. But not to take this upon trust, let me begin with the Pamphlet it self. The Author of which opens in a thundring manner, calling all Traitors, who opposed his Patron's pacific Temper.

P. 3. " The Endeavours that have been
 " used to inflame the People into an high
 " Dislike of the present Measures, are so
 " flagrant, are so full of an incendiary Spi-
 " rit, have so manifest a Tendency to Se-
 " dition and Rebellion, and are in every
 " View so very criminal, and so big with
 " Mischief, that an honest Man (*which is a*
 " *plain Indication, he thought all otherwise,*
 " *who dissented from his Opinion,*) who means
 " nothing but the Public Good, the Ho-
 " nour of the King, and the Interest of
 " his Country, can't think of them, with-
 " out the greatest Indignation." As I have
 not room here to go through every Para-
 graph in this wonderful Piece (which would
 have been answer'd when it first came out,
 but that its Nature made it unanswerable
 till now) I shall only extract such as are suf-
 ficient for my present Purpose.

He tells us, p. 9. " That the *Emperor* and
 " *States-General* are not in a Condition to
 " assist us, however willing they might be,
 " the burden of the last Wars lying too
 " heavy upon them, and that those Powers
 D 2 " are

“ are the only two of any Consequence.”
 p. 10. “ As to the *Northern Crowns*, *France*
 “ has already bought one by a large an-
 “ nual Subsidy, and is in Treaty with the
 “ other; and if it were not so, what
 “ is it we could expect from them, but
 “ to be furnished with Men, if we could
 “ find Money?” By this he endeavour’d
 to shew, that as to our part, we were with-
 out Money, and without Allies, and there-
 fore could not possibly carry on the War
 but at a manifest Disadvantage. And on the
 other hand, he proves *Spain* to have both
 at her Command. “ But is it so with *Spain*?
 “ Are they without Allies also? Are we
 “ sure *France* will not assist *Spain*, when a
 “ Branch of the House of *Bourbon* is upon
 “ the *Spanish* Throne? Is not a double
 “ Match between the two Crowns every day
 “ talk’d on, as a Thing done? And may
 “ we not suppose such Matches will be at-
 “ tended with an offensive and defensive
 “ Alliance, if there be not one already?”
 p. 10. “ Suppose then, we could in other
 “ respects make War with *Spain* upon an e-
 “ qual Foot, are we alone a Match for *France*
 “ and *Spain* both? — Is it not then high-
 “ ly reasonable, is it not absolutely neces-
 “ sary, we should be sure *France* won’t take
 “ part against us, before we enter into a
 “ War with *Spain*?” (By which, he seems
 to insinuate, that it would be highly prudent
 to ask *France* leave first.) “ But that is what
 “ we

“ we are so far from being sure of, that I
 “ think, I may say, we are morally sure
 “ of the contrary, from a consideration of
 “ the mutual Interests of the two Crowns,
 “ which is the only firm Cement in all
 “ Alliances?”

The Sum of this sophistical way of Reasoning, may be comprehended in the following Words, *viz.* Ye Good People of *England!* Harken unto the Voice of your M——rs, interested in your Safety, and suffer not yourselves to be led away by the positive Declarations of the opposite Party, how reasonable soever they may appear to you. How is it possible you should rightly judge of Facts? Trust therefore to your M——y; believe all they say, commend all they do, approve of every Measure they pursue, even when it should appear contradictory to your Reason so to do. Because you may be satisfied the M——ry cannot err: They are chosen Men; Men of vast Abilities, of uncommon Prudence, of deep Penetration, of the strictest Honour, of the utmost Probity, of the greatest Fortunes. And consequently Men who despise a base Action, who hate Intriguing, who scorn Flattery, who abhor Corruption, and who would spurn at a Bribe.

These, *Britons!* are your Rulers, and under the Government of such, think yourselves happy. On the other hand be assured,

ed, that their Opposers are a restless Faction, the very Spawn of *Jacobitism*: Men, who are as eminent for their Vices, as the M——ry are conspicuous for their Virtues. “ This has induced me to enter impartial-
 “ ly into a particular Discussion of the pre-
 “ sent Measures, to undeceive those who
 “ are desirous of the best Information they
 “ can get, in Matters relating to the Public,
 “ and to recover the well-meaning from the
 “ Infatuation great Numbers have been de-
 “ luded into.” You have been artfully
 work’d up into a Heat against your Govern-
 nors, for not declaring War against *Spain*.
 But at the same time, are ignorant of the
 melancholy Situation you are in, having
 neither Money nor Allies. ’Tis from these
 two weighty Considerations, not from any
 fervile Fear, that we have accepted of a
 Peace, which is as good a one as we could
 get, and had it been much worse, in our
 present Condition, we should be strictly justi-
 fied in obtaining it.

After having taken all these Pains to
 justify the Con——n, by endeavouring
 to prove us inferiour to the united Force
 of *France* and *Spain*; he in Compliment
 to his Opposers, is ready to admit, that *France*
 as well as the rest of *Europe*, will remain
 idle Spectators of the War between *Eng-
 land* and *Spain*; and then proceeds to shew,
 that we are far from being an equal Match
 for

for *Spain* alone. " For says he, *p. 15.*
 " *Spain* may attempt a Land War upon us,
 " but we can't make a Land War upon
 " *Spain.*" By which I suppose he means,
 that *Spain* is much farther from *England*,
 than *England* from *Spain*, or else the Dif-
 ficulty on both sides would be the same.
 Again, " If we begin the War in *Europe*,
 " all we can do, is to attack the whole
 " Navy of *Spain*, and thereby give a deci-
 " sive Stroke. But *Spain* begs to be ex-
 " cused: She knows her own Weakness
 " too well, to engage us openly, but will
 " rather suffer us to ride Masters of the
 " Sea; not that she will lie idle all the
 " while; no, she will carry on a Pyratrical
 " War upon us, and infest all the Coasts
 " from *Bayonne* to *Cadiz*, with Privateers
 " of her own, and of other Nations un-
 " der *Spanish* Colours, so that very few
 " of our Merchant-Men will be able to
 " pass them."

This wholesome Advice, *Spain* seems to
 have taken, for which she is not a little
 obligated to her *Anglo-Spaniard*. Next he
 comforts us with an Assurance, that the War
 would not be at all mended, by carrying
 it into the *West-Indies*. For which *Spain*
 is also highly obliged to him.

P. 18. " If we could get any Settlement
 " there, I don't know we desire it; and if
 " we did, it's *forbidden Fruit*. Then, as to
 " the

“ the Galleons, it's impossible to send a
 “ Squadron thither time enough to seize
 “ them. Because, as such a Thing could
 “ not be kept secret, *Spain* would dispatch
 “ a light, clean Frigate or two to the *West-*
 “ *Indies*, in half the time a Squadron would
 “ be going thither. The Consequence of
 “ which would be, that if the Galleons were
 “ loaded they would immediately be unload-
 “ ed.” (*No doubt Spain followed his Instructions;*
for this was the very Case last Year, on Admiral
V——n's Arrival in those Parts.) “ So that
 “ all we could in such a Case do, would be
 “ to burn the Hulks. Neither might we
 “ be able to do that, because the Water
 “ might be too shallow for our Ships of
 “ War to reach them.”

If these are not sufficient Reasons against
 carrying on the War in that Part of the
 World ; I'll extract a few more from the
 same ingenious Piece.

P. 21. “ But admit you could have the
 “ good Fortune to take a rich Fleet coming
 “ from the *West-Indies*. Don't we know,
 “ that at least one *Half* of that great Trea-
 “ sure belongs to the *French*, and the Re-
 “ mainder to other Nations, and that the
 “ *Spaniards* Share does not exceed a *Tenth*
 “ Part. And can we imagine that other
 “ Nations, and above all, the *French* would
 “ bear that their Properties, on board these
 “ Vessels, shall become a Prey to *England*?”
 Could

Could any Man alive imagine this to be the Language of an *Englishman*, and of a Friend to the present M——y. But to proceed. “ If, says he, we can’t take ’em, “ and propose to hinder their Return to “ *Europe* for any long time, which would “ greatly distress the *Spaniards*, it must be “ by stationing our Ships at the *Bastimen-* “ *tos*. And we have found by Experience, “ in 1726, that we should suffer a thou- “ sand times more Damage by it.” To which the *Craftsman* of March 31, 1739. replies, That the Bay of *Matanzas*, in the Island of *Cuba*, was a more convenient Place for that Purpose, than the *Bastimen-* “ *tos*; where our Squadron would have a much better Chance of intercepting both the *Flota* and the *Galleons*.

P. 20. “ What is it then we can expect “ from a War in those Parts, if we can “ neither make ourselves Masters of any of “ their Settlements, nor of the Treasure “ they bring from them?” We think Admiral V——n has already sufficiently answered this Question. But in Return, I would ask this sagacious Author another. If what he has thus advanced were undeniable Facts; that we could neither prosecute a War with *Spain* to any Advantage, in *Europe* nor *A-* “ *merica*, where can it be carried on? No where, as I know of. What Inference therefore can be drawn from such *weak*, such

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wicked Suggestions? None but this: That if we were reduced to such a State; it would be our best Method (as a contemptible People) to submit to the most *infamous* Treatment from that Power, and to accept of any *scandalous* Terms rather than presume to *resent* such Usage, which we knew ourselves incapable to *revenge*. But as this is far from being the Case of *Great Britain*, such idle Arguments only serve to shew to what pitiful Shifts and mean Arts the Author is reduced.

P. 21. "Suppose, says he, for one Year
 "we had made War with no better Success,
 "what shall we do the next? Shall we have
 "any Stomach to go on another Year? Is
 "there any better Prospect of Success?
 From whence he concludes, that those who were then so hot for a War, "would be
 "very impatient for a Peace, *upon almost*
 "*any Terms.*"

What wicked, infamous Insinuations are these? Could any thing worse have come from an Enemy? Rather let me see the abandon'd Wretch (whoever he be) that has so vilely and falsely misrepresented the Strength of his Country, delivered to the Executioner to be hung up for a *public Mark of Infamy*, than such Prophecies ever fulfilled.

What shall *four Millions Sterling per Annum* be expended in carrying on a ruinous, disgraceful, Privateering War? Are we so ignorant

ignorant in what Manner *Spain* has been distressed by us in former Wars, as tamely to submit to so ignominious a Conduct? If this be suffered, nay, I will go further and say, If the next Year's War ends (as the *Grand Question*, &c. has most basely prophesied) with doing the Enemy no more Damage in Proportion, than what we have hitherto done; I know not, but then we might be obliged, of Necessity, to accept of another *infamous Convention*.

Let us but take a View of the Enemy's Behaviour during the last Year, and we shall find he has acted according to the Rules prescribed him in the *Grand Question*. He has suffered us to ride Masters of the Sea, if we thought fit, and has only prosecuted the War by his Privateers; too successfully I own. *France* has also, (as there insinuated) peremptorily forbid us from meddling with the Galleons, or falling upon the Enemies Settlements in *America*. And our Fleets have, I think, too much acquiesced with the *Cardinal's* Prescriptions. Nay the *French King* has further presumed to send his Squadrons thither, to prevent us from pursuing any Conquests in *New Spain*; and to load his Ships with the Riches of the *Indies*, in contempt of our Power or Threats; both which they affect to despise. The affair of the Reparation of *Dunkirk*, is a fresh but melancholy Proof of such Truths.

On the other Hand, let us examine how the M——y, in the Management of the War, have stuck to what was there inserted. And we shall find, by setting aside the two Conquests which Admiral V——n executed in *America*, that they have acted much in the same Manner.

First of all, that brave Admiral was dispatch'd without any Land Forces, and none sent after him for above a Twelvemonth. Why? It could not be because we had none on Foot in the three Kingdoms. But I suppose to make good that Author's Assertion, that Land-Forces would be of no Use to us in *America*, because the *Spanish* Possessions were *Forbidden-Fruit*; and consequently all Mr. V——n's Business would be to catch a rich Prize now and then, and hinder the Return of the *Galleons* to *Europe*; for take them we dare not, for fear of offending *France*.

As to the two Conquests that Admiral made, it was so far from being expected here, that a worthy Gentleman at the Head of the A——ty has more than once declared in public Company, (on V——n's setting-cut) that the Force he had with him, was too insufficient to storm any Place of Consequence in the *West-Indies*, So we are obliged to none, as I know of, for what he has done, but the A——-l himself. Then in Regard to *Europe*; the Exploits of H——k, O——e, B——n, C——sh, and N——s, are
sufficient

sufficient to demonstrate how exactly we have kept up to the original Picture. We have indeed, as the above quoted Author says, preserved *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, but the D—l of any thing else have we done, except taking a few rich Prizes. It will be alledg'd, no doubt, that the Winds prevented Sir J—n N——s's going out at a proper Time; but let such give a satisfactory Reason in P——t, why the Fleet could not be prepared for the intended Expedition two Months sooner.

It's to be hoped, I have now made good my Promise in the Title-Page of this Piece, by proving the first Year's Conduction of the War, agreeable to the Arguments laid down in the *Grand Question*, &c. Which at the Time of its Publication, was so well received by the M——r, that between *three* and *four thousand* Copies were printed and dispers'd with the DAILY GAZETTEERS, throughout the three Kingdoms; for what end, we can't (at this distance of time) be at a Loss to know.

'Tis therefore evident from the above undeniable Arguments, that if the War be conducted in the same languid Manner for a Year or two longer, as threatned in the *Grand Question*, which undoubtedly was wrote with a View to terrify the People of *England* from entring into so just and necessary a Measure for asserting and vindicating